Dr. Richard Double

Richard Double is an expert in the free will problem and analytic philosophy generally. He has written over 40 journal articles, two widely acclaimed books on free will, The Non-Reality of Free Will (1991) and Metaphilosophy and Free Will (1996), as well as his introductory text Beginning Philosophy (1998), all published by Oxford University Press. Double serves as referee to eleven philosophy journals and submissions-reader for Oxford University Press, Cambridge University Press, MIT Press, and SUNY Press.

Introduction to Philosophy and Values

Logic

Metaphysics

Modern Philosophy

Theory of Knowledge

Department of Philosophy
Edinboro University of Pennsylvania
Edinboro, PA 16444
Office: 814-732-1125
Email: rdouble@edinboro.edu

1977 Ph.D., Philosophy, Rutgers University.

1972 M.A., Philosophy, Rutgers University.

1970 B.A., Philosophy, Temple University.

Title: Central State Materialism
Director: Peter D. Klein

Ethics

Free Will Problem

Philosophy of Mind

Philosophy of Psychology

1989 - Pr. Edinboro University of PA, Full Professor

1986 - 88 Indiana University, Purdue University, Visiting Assistant Professor

1985 - 86 Castleton State College, Assistant Professor

1984 University of Texas at Arlington, Visiting Assistant Professor

1983 Westminster College, Visiting Assistant Professor

1981 - 83 Old Dominion University, Assistant Professor

1979 - 81 East Carolina University, Visiting Assistant Professor

(1) The Non-Reality of Free Will (a monograph), Oxford University Press, 1991.

(2) Metaphilosophy and Free Will (a monograph), Oxford University Press, 1996.

(3) Beginning Philosophy (an introductory monograph), Oxford University Press, 1999.

(4) Metaethical Subjectivism (a monograph), in preparation.

(1) "The Inconclusiveness of Kripke's Argument Against the Identity Theory," Auslegung, June 1976, 156 - 65.

(2) "Quine and the Determinateness of Reference," Kinesis, Spring 1977, 49 - 61.

(3) "Hume's Empirical Argument for Empiricism," Southern Journal of Philosophy, Winter 1978, 329 - 37.

(4) "Taylor's Refutation of Epiphenomenalism," The Journal of Critical Analysis, Summer/Fall 1979, 23 - 28.

(5) "Central State Materialism," Philosophical Studies (Ireland), 1980, 229 - 37.

(6) "Teaching the Philosophy of Sport," Teaching Philosophy, January 1981, 47 - 53.

(7) "On a Wittgensteinian Objection to Kripke's Dualism Argument," Philosophy Research Archives, 1981.

(8) "There Are No Persons," The Intersection of Science Fiction and Philosophy, Robert E. Myers, ed., Greenwood Press, 1983, 109 - 20.

(9) "Searle, Programs, and Functionalism," Nature and System, 1983, 107 - 14.

(10) "Nagel's Argument that Mental Properties are Nonphysical," Philosophy Research Archives, 1983, 217 - 22.

(11) "Reply to Fields," Nature and System, 1984, 55 - 57.

(12) "Searle's Answer to Hume's Problem," Southern Journal of Philosophy, Fall 1984, 435 - 38.

(13) "Brain Bisection: Philosophy meets Science," Dialogos, April 1984, 39 - 48.

(14) "Theory of Knowledge," Essays in Introduction to Philosophy, W. Brenner and J. Andre, eds., Ginn Publishers, 1985, 70 - 83.

(15) "Phenomenal Properties," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, March 1985, 383 - 92.

(16) "The Case Against the Case Against Belief," Mind, July 1985, 356 - 66.

(17) "On the Very Idea of Eliminating the Intentional," Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, July 1986, 209 - 16.

(18) "Twin Earths, Ersatz Pains, and Fool's Minds," Metaphilosophy, October 1986, 300 - 10.

(19) "More on the Ineliminable Intentional: A Reply to Churchland," Journal of The Theory of Social Behavior, July 1987, 219 - 25.

(20) "The Computational Model of the Mind and Philosophical Functionalism," Behaviorism, Fall 1987, 131 - 39.

(21) "Fear of Sphexishness," Analysis, January 1988, 20 - 25.

(22) "Libertarianism and Rationality," Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1988, 431 - 39. Reprinted in Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will, T. O'Connor, ed., Oxford University Press, 1994.

(23) "Meta-Compatibilism," American Philosophical Quarterly, 1988, 323 - 29.

(24) "What's Wrong with Self-Serving Epistemic Strategies?," Philosophical Psychology, 1988, 341 - 48.

(25) "Puppeteers, Hypnotists, and Neurosurgeons," Philosophical Studies, 1989, 163 - 73.

(26) "Reply to Ward," Behaviorism, 1989, 59 - 60.

(27) "Explaining Perceived Choice," Contemporary Social Psychology, June 1990, 119 - 26.

(28) "Sayre-McCord on Evaluative Facts," Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1990, 165 - 69.

(29) "Cognitive Errors in Sports Analysis," Rethinking College Athletics, J. Andre and D. James, eds., Temple University Press, 1991, 134 - 48.

(30) "Determinism and the Experience of Freedom," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, March 1991, 1 - 8.

(31) "Two Types of Autonomy Accounts," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, March 1992, 65 - 80.

(32) "How Rational Must Free Will Be?," Metaphilosophy, July 1992, 268 - 78.

(33) "The Principle of Rational Explanation Defended," Southern Journal of Philosophy, Summer 1993, 133 - 42.

(34) "How to Frame the Free Will Problem," Philosophical Studies (USA), August 1994, vol. 75, 149 - 72. [Invited article in special free will issue.]

(35) "A Defense of Determinism," History as the Story of Freedom, C. Butler, Editions Rodopi, 1995, 69 - 70.

(36) "Honderich on the Consequences of Determinism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, December 1996, vol. 56, 847 - 54.

(37) "Four Naturalistic Accounts of Moral Responsibility," Behavior and Philosophy, Fall 1996, vol. 24, 137 - 43.

(38) "Misdirection in the Free Will Problem," American Philosophical Quarterly, July 1997, vol. 34, 359 - 68. Included on Ted Honderich's Freedom and Determinism Website: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwVariousDouble.html.

(39) "In the Defense of the Smart Aleck: A Reply to Ted Honderich," Journal of Philosophical Research, 1999, vol. 24, 305 - 309.

(40) "Morality, Impartiality, and What We Can Ask of Persons," American Philosophical Quarterly, 1999, vol. 36, 156 - 63.

(41) "Metaethics, Metaphilosophy, and Free Will Subjectivism," The Oxford Free Will Handbook, Robert Kane, ed. Oxford University Press, 2002, 506 - 28. Reprinted in PHILOSOPHY: THE BIG QUESTIONS edited by Ruth Sample, Charles Mills, and James Sterba (Blackwell, 2004).

(42) "Double Freedom: Richard Double Makes Room for Free Will," Philosophers' Magazine, Spring 2002, 17 - 18.

(43) "The Moral Hardness of Libertarianism," Philo, Vol. 5, no. 2, 2002, 226 - 34. Included on Ted Honderich's Freedom and Determinism Website: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwDoubleCompat.html.

(44) "When Subjectivism Matters," Metaphilosophy, Vol. 34, no. 4, 2003, 510 - 23.

(45) "Informal Fallacies in James's 'The Will to Believe'," Think, 2003, 29 - 34.

(46) "The Ethical Advantages of Free Will Subjectivism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (Accepted October 2, 2002.)

(1) "Diversity and Relativism," Values Newsletter, Spring 1997, vol. 4.

(2) "Thought Experiments in Ethics Courses," Values Newsletter, Spring 1998, vol. 5.

(3) "Sports: Artificial Meritocracy in a Largely Unjust World," Scholars, Spring 1999, vol. 7, 6 - 11.

(4) "The Value of Kant’s Principle of Ends," Values Newsletter, Fall 2000, vol. 8.

(5) "Moral Theory, Moral Practice, and Extreme Cases," Values Newsletter, Spring 2003, vol. 10.

(1) Metaphysical Thinking, by Elmer Sprague, Teaching Philosophy, 1979, 106 - 08.

(2) The Mental as the Physical, by Edgar Wilson, Philosophical Studies (Ireland), 1981, 342 - 50.

(3) A Concise Introduction to Philosophy and Concise Readings in Philosophy, by William Halverson, Teaching Philosophy, 1982, 177 - 78.

(4) Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem, by Michael Levin, Philosophical Studies (Ireland), 1982 - 83, 228 - 34.

(5) Commissurotomy, Consciousness, and Unity of Mind, by Charles Marks, Review of Metaphysics, 1983, 726 - 28.

(6) Sports and Athletics, by Joseph Mihalick, Teaching Philosophy, 1984, 73 - 75.

(7) The Character of Mind, by Colin McGinn, Philosophical Studies (Ireland), 1984, 252.

(8) The Will, by Brian O’shaughnessy, Philosophical Studies (Ireland), 1984, 370 - 71.

(9) Free Will and Values, by Robert Kane, Philosophical Books, 1988, 96 - 97.

(10) Freedom and Belief, by Galen Strawson, Behaviorism, 1989, 177 - 79.

(11) Freedom within Reason, by Susan Wolf, Mind, 1992, 198 - 200.

(12) Will and World, by N.M.L. Nathan, Ethics, 1993, 605.

(13) The Psychology of Human Freedom: A Human Science Approach and Critique, by Malcolm Westcott, Contemporary Psychology, 1993, 73.

(14) The Question of Free Will, by Morton White, Ethics, April 1995, 679 - 80.

(15) Through the Moral Maze, by Robert Kane, Ethics, October 1995, 221.

(16) How Free Are You?, by Ted Honderich, Philosophical Books, 1995, 265 - 66.

(17) The Metaphysics of Free Will, by John Martin Fischer, Mind, 1995, 300 - 04.

(18) Perceived Control, Motivation, and Coping, by Ellen Skinner, Contemporary Psychology, 1996, 360 - 61.

(19) Liberation from Self: A Theory of Personal Autonomy, by Bernard Berofsky, Mind, 1996, 337 - 41.

(20) Free Will: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction, by Ilham Dilman, Ethics, 2000, 201.

(21) Free Will and Illusion, by Saul Smilansky, Mind, 2001, 271 - 74.

(22) Free Will, by Laura Waddell Ekstrom, Philosophical Books, 2002, 303 - 05.

(23) Living without Free Will, by Derk Pereboom, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2003, 494 - 97.

American Philosophical Association (Eastern and Central Divisions)

Bowdoin College (Spring 2002 Invited Lecturer)

Eastern Pennsylvania Philosophical Association (Fall 1992 Invited Keynote Speaker)

Fort Wayne Kiwanis Club

Indiana Philosophical Association

Intermountain Philosophy Conference

New Jersey Regional Philosophical Association

North Carolina Philosophy Association

Society for Philosophy and Psychology

Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology

Tri-State Philosophical Association

University of Texas at Austin (Fall 1995, Invited Keynote Speaker)

Virginia Philosophical Association

West Texas Philosophical Association

American Philosophical Quarterly

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Behavior and Philosophy

Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior

Metaphilosophy

Nous

Philosophical Quarterly

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Philosophical Studies (USA)

Synthese

Teaching Philosophy

University of Texas at San Antonio, 1998

Randolph Clarke (1995), "Recent Work on Freedom and Determinism," Philosophical Books, vol. 36, 9 - 18.

Ted Honderich (1996), "Determinism and Freedom," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Supplement), New York: Macmillan, 128 - 29.

Galen Strawson (1998), "Free Will," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London: Routledge, 743 - 53.

John Martin Fischer (1999), "Recent Work on Moral Responsibility," Ethics, vol. 110, 93 - 139.

Andrew Eschelman (2001), StanfordOnline Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/.

The Charlie Huddle Show, WTAR Radio, Norfolk, VA, March 8, 1983.

National Endowment for the Humanities Fellow: The Nature and Value of Autonomy, June 25 - August 17, 1990, University of Illinois (Chicago), directed by Gerald Dworkin.

Fellowship in the Computer Science for Philosophers Program: Wright State University, 1984 - 85.

National Endowment for the Humanities Fellow: The Philosophical Implications of Cognitive Science, June 27 - August 19, 1983, University of Maryland, directed by Stephen Stich.

Council for Philosophical Studies Fellow: Summer Institute on Philosophy and Psychology, June 21 - July 31, 1981, University of Washington, directed by Jerry Fodor.

Edmund Abegg, Edinboro University of Pennsylvania, Edinboro, PA 16444.

Mark Bernstein, University of Texas, San Antonio, TX 78249.

Robert Cogan, Edinboro University of Pennsylvania, Edinboro, PA 16444.

Ted Honderich, Grote Professor Emeritus, University College London, NW3 2RT, UK.

Robert Kane, University of Texas, Austin, TX 78712-1180.

Terry Smith, Dean of Liberal Arts, Edinboro University of Pennsylvania, Edinboro, PA 16444.

Bruce Waller, Youngstown State University, Youngstown, OH 44555-3448.